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Hatcher: Battersey's Case (1623): Some Ups and Downs of the Rule Three Pro

BATTERSEY'S CASE (1623)
SOME UPS AND DOWNS OF THE RULE THERE PRONOUNCED, AFFECT-

ING CONTRIBUTIONS BETWEEN JOINT WRONGDOERS.

JonN H. HATmCm*

The earliest English cases I have found of actions between
joint wrongdoers-are Arundel v. Gardiner,"and Battersey's Case,2
decided in 1622 and 1623, respectively. Each case permitted the
recovery of indemnity. The former declared no abstract principle
of law. The latter said indemnity could not be had where the
tortious act "appears in itself to be unlawful, but otherwise it is,
as in our case, where the act stands indifferent." My attention
has been drawn to no other such action antedating 1799 (though
doubtless there were many), when Merryweather v. Nixan,3 without reference to any earlier decision on this subject, is taken to
have held that no contribution whatever could be had between
joint tortfeasors. This holding was recognized in Farebrotherv.
Avsley,4 Wilson v. Milner,5 and other cases of that generation.
But, in 1827, Adamson v. Jarvis6 limited hat holding in this manner: "from reason, justice and sound policy, the rule that wrongdoers cannot have redress or contribution against each other, is
confined to cases where the person seeking redress must be presumed to have known that he was doing an unlawful act." This
limitation was followed in Betts v. Gibbons,7 in which Battersey's
Case was referred to, though sub nom. Fletcher v. Harcot, 'Chief
Justice Lord Denman saying, "The case of ferryweather v. Nixan
seems to me to have been strained beyond what the decision will
bear ... The general rule is that between wrongdoers there is
neither indemnity nor contribution; the exception is where the act
is not clearly illegal in itself."" And as far as I am advised, this
exception to the general rule has remained the law of England to
this day.' The exception was recognized in the United States, cerF
Former judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals. Charleston, West Virginia.

1 Cro. Jac. 652, 79 Eng. Rep. R. 563 (1622).
2 Winch 49, 124 Eng. Rep. R. 41, sub. 'om. Fletcher v. Harcot, Hutton 55,

123 Eng. Rep. R. 1097 (1623).
a8 T. R.186, 101 Eng. Rep. R. 1337 (1799).
41 Camp. 343, 170 Eng. Rep. R. 979 (1808).
G2 Camp. 452, 170 Eng. Rep. R.1215 (1810).
a 4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Rep. R.693 (1827).
72 Ad. & E. 57, 111 ,ng. Rep. R.22 (1834).
8At p. 74. Accord: Pearson v. Shelton, 1 Mv.& W. 504, 150 Eng. Rep. R.
533 (1836).
0 See PoLLo x, ToRTs (13th ed.) 203.
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tainly as early as 1800 in the New York case of Allaire v. Oulandl,1O
though no citation of authority or statement of law was made. In
1819, however, the same court in Coventry v. Barton," (another
indemnity case), recognized the exception, citing Battersey's Case
and other authorities. Then, in 1823, in Thweatt's Adm'r v.
Jones," Judge Green, though not mentioning Battersey's Case,
declared, in effect, its postulate. After discussing the reason underlying the general rule against contribution amongst joint wrongdoers, he said the reason "does not apply to torts or injuries arising
from mistakes or accidents ....
The act which precludes a party
front the right to claim contribution from those who are equally
liable to the burthen as himself, must be malum in se, as actual
fraud or voluntary wrong." Since the supreme court of Virginia
prior to the Civil War was the curial predecessor of our own court,
further comment on the Thweatt-Jones suit would seem pertinent.
In this suit contribution was sought by the administrator of an
inspector of tobacco against the administrator of a co-inspector on
account of judgments paid by the former, inasmuch as "nakedly"
alleged in the bill, "the recoveries were for a joint malversation
in office." The trial chancellor dismissed the bill. The Virginia
court then consisted of five judges, Fleming, Green, Coalter, Cabell and Brooke. Fleming was absent when the cause was decided.
Green and Cabell would have" reversed the decree; Coalter and
Brooke affirmed it; so it stood. Cabell stated as a general principle,
that contribution would not be enforced among the participators in
a tort; but that the principle had never been extended "to the nonperformance of a civil obligation or duty, where that non-performance does not proceed ex maleficio." Both Coalter and Brooke
stated the general principle above; both recognized that there were
exceptions to it; but both were of opinion that the allegations of
the bill were insufficient to bring the suit within an exception.
Coalter did not define abstractly what joint wrongs were not ineluded in the general rule. Brooke said that courts of equity
would "relieve in all cases, in which the parties are in aequaZi jure,
but would not do so where the parties are in pari dellcto." The
syllabus (presumably prepared by Peyton Randolph) would uphold the right of contribution in equity, where the dereliction
"does not proceed ex maZleficio or from some actual fraud or voluntary wrong." Recognition of this qualification followed in a num1

2 Johns..52 (N. Y. 1800).

1117 Johns. 142 (N. Y. 1819).
121 Rand. 328 (Va. 1823). -
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ber of cases, including Bailey v. Bussing, which, after reviewing
the English decisions, including Battersey's Case, held: "The rule
that there can be no contribution among wrongdoers, has so many
exceptions that it can hardly with propriety be called a general
rule. It applies properly only to cases where there has been an
intentional violation of law, or where the wrongdoer is to be presumed to have known that the act was unlawful." Other early
accordant cases are Acheson v. Miller, 4 Horbach's Adm'rs v.
Elder,5 Hunt v. Lane,8 Davis v. Arledge,'7 Jacobs v. Pollard,""
Moore v. Appleton,'9 Ankeny v. Moffett, 0 and Herr v. Barber.2
There are many later accordant cases, including such strong eases
2
as Hobbs v. Hurley,2 2 Ellis v. Chicago & Northwestern R .Co., 3
Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co.,24 Eureka Coal Co. v. Louisville
2
20
"
Horrabinv. Des Moines, and Turner v. Kirkwood.
& N. R. R.1
Exceptions to the general rule (so-called) are noted in many encyclopedias and textbooks.28
On the other hand a number of the earlier American decisions
did tadopt the rule of Merryweather v. Nixan, despite its limitation
by the English courts. Addison says the rule is that of the states.29
But, according to Theodore W. Reath, attorney, who in 1898 carefully reviewed the decisions 'pronouncing the rule, the facts in
every one showed "either an intentional tort or an act, as a basis
of joint liability, which is malum in se or immoral. No case has
been found applying the rule to a joint tort or quasi delict not
1328 Conn. 455 (1859).
14 2 Ohio St. 203 (1853).
't 18 Pa. St. 33 (1851).
'a 9 Ind. 248, 250-1 (1857).
73 Hill 170 (S. C. 1836).
28 10 Cush. 287, 57 Am. Dee. 105 (Mass. 1852).
'926 Ala. 633 (1855).
20 37 Aim. 109, 33 N. W. 320 (1887).
212 Mackey 545, 556 (Dist. Col. 1883).
22 117 Me. 449, 104 At. 815 (1918).
23167 Wis.392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918).
24292 Pa. 354, 141 AtI. 231 (1928).
25219 ALL 286, 122 So. 169 (1929).
28198 Iowa 549, 199 N. W. 988, 38 A. L. R.554 (1924).
27 49 F. (2d) 590, 596 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
28 7 Am. & ENG. ENCY. L.&w 365-6; 13 C. J. 829 et se.; 18 C. T. S.15 et
seg.; (1915) 6 R. C. L. 1054 et segq.; 13 Am. JuR., Contribution § 37 et seg.;
CooL=, ToTS (4th ed.) 297 et seg.; I JAGGARD, TORTS (1895) 215-216; PoLLOOK, ToRTs 203; 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIEmLD, NFGLIGmo (6th ed. 1913) 24b;
BisHop, NoN-CONTRACT LAw (1889) 22-23; 2 CHrUY, CoNTCFrATs (11th ed.
ROD
NARY RFMEDIES 1484.
1881) 897; 2 POmEmOY, EX
291 ADDIsON, ToRTs (1887) 98.
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intentional and not immoral.''" Following 1898, a number of
courts, "the great majority of modern authority", says one commentator,81 did deny contribution where the wrongs were neither
intentional nor immoral but simply negligent, notably the supreme
court of Virginia. Walton v. Mifler, 2 decided in 1909, without
citation of authority, held flatly that the right of contribution did
not exist among joint tortfeasors. This holding was repeated in
several later Virginia cases until checked in 1919 by the following
statute: "Contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced where
the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral turpitude." Thus the statute revived, in effect, the doctrine of Battersey's Case as well as the judicial declarations in Thweatt's
Adm'r v. Jones, which seemingly had been unchallenged in Virginia from 1823 to 1909. And the Supreme Court pf West Virginia, in Buskirk v. Sanders (1912),31 referred to that decision
and held that contribution between joint tortfeasors may be !had,
except where the wrong is malum in se.8 4
Some authorities say that the common law did not permit contribution among wrongdoers. This statement seems ill-advised.
The brief acceptance of the rule of Merryweather v. Nixan by the
English courts from 1799 to 1827 cannot be taken to establish the
rule as the common law of England, when opp6sed by nearly three
centuries of preceding and succeeding English cases limiting the
rule; and the American cases in line with Merryweather v. Nixan
can hardly be taken to establish its rule as the common law of the
states when consistently opposed by such a vigorous array of other
American cases qualifying the rule. It would seem the most to be
said is that the decisions conflict on what 'he common law is. Amid
such confusion, I see no reason to desert the side of the conflict
heretofore adopted by our own court, the side on which lies, according to Adamson v. Jarvis, "reason, justice and sound policy".
This study, obviously, does not include West Virginia Revised
Code (1931) c. 55, art. 7, see. 13.
30 Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence Merryweather v. Nxan (1898) 12 HARv. L. REV. 176, 182.
31 Leflar, Contributionand Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. oF

PA. L. REv. 140-141.

82109 Va. 210, 63 S. E. 458 (1909).
88 70 W. Va. 370, 73 S. E. 937 (1912).
84Accord: Hutcherson v. Slate, 105 W. Va. 184, 190, 142 S. E. 444 (1928);

Payne v. Charleston Nat. Bank, 112 W. Va. 251, 164 S. E. 252 (1932).
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